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Abstract 
The explosion of globalization has increased firms incentives to exploit international tax differentials to 
their benefit. In this paper we consider a simple world with two countries with different market sizes 
and two multinationals with a division in each country. Both countries use a source-based profit tax on 
multinationals, who compete a la Cournot in each local market and use profit shifting based on the tax 
differential.  We  assess  policies  aimed  to  mitigate  inefficient  tax  choices  and  show  that  tax 
harmonization cannot benefit the small country which adopts a lower tax rate to channel a tax revenue 
from the large country. We propose a simple revenue sharing mechanism in which countries share equal 
proportion of their own revenue with each other. It is shown that revenue sharing increases equilibrium 
tax rates in each country, reduces the tax differential, and benefits both countries despite of reallocation 
of resources from the high tax to the low tax country  
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 1 Introduction
Globalization has made corporations increasingly mobile across jurisdictions
but it is also characterized by the development of multinational ﬁrms with
many divisions across diﬀerent countries. The source-based system of corpo-
rate taxation is widely used due to the practical diﬃculties of implementing
the residence-based systems (according to which income from capital is taxed
in the country of residence of the owner of capital). Under the source-based
taxation, the income from capital is taxed in the country in which the income
is generated. If the tax authority seeks to tax the proﬁt where it is gener-
ated, then a multinational ﬁrm will have an incentive to choose the location
of proﬁt in a low-tax jurisdiction. This can be done by changing the physical
location of the ﬁrm, but it can also be more easily done by restructuring the
ﬁnancial ﬂows between divisions to make it appear that proﬁt is earned in a
diﬀerent location. This option is increasingly used by multinational ﬁrms as
illustrated in Devereux et al (2003) and Auerbach et al (2010).
Horizontal foreign direct investment has become a major policy issue in
the past decades, as multinational ﬁrms carry out growing proportions of
international economic activity (according to the OECD, around 60% of in-
ternational trade involves transactions between two related parts of multina-
tionals). The empirical evidence indicates that FDI by multinationals grew
rapidly in the last 15 years of the 20th century, far outpacing the growth of
international trade among industrialized countries. Foreign-owned multina-
tionals employ 1 worker in every 5 in European manufacturing and 1 in every
7 in US manufacturing; they sell 1 euro in every 4 of manufactured goods
in Europe and 1 dollar in every 5 in the US (OECD, 2001). The fact that
multinationals use their various aﬃliates as a means to shift proﬁts across
countries is well documented. Examples of the means used for proﬁt shift-
ing are the transfer prices, dividend and royalty payments, among others.1
This situation is costly for both ﬁrms and tax authorities because it creates
business uncertainty and because governments’ coordination failures lead to
ineﬃciently low taxation. Also a country that chooses higher corporate taxes
will quickly discover other countries reaping the beneﬁts.
The ﬁrst response to proﬁt shifting was to impose limits on transfer pric-
ing (see Samuelson (1982)).2 To prevent ﬁrms from using transfer pricing to
1See Hines (1999) for a survey of the empirical literature, Clausing (2003), Huizinga and
Laeven (2007), and Weichenrieder (2007), as examples of the more recent contributions
using ﬁrm-level data, and Collins and Shackelford (1997) for non-transfer pricing channels
of proﬁt shifting
2The limits on transfer prices have simple implications: A higher transfer price will
raise the proﬁt of the division producing the good, whereas a lower transfer price will raise
1reduce tax liability many government have adopted rules on transfer pricing.
The key feature of these rules is the principle of an arm’s-length price putting
lower and upper bounds on transfer prices. The problem is that those limits
must be acceptable and freely chosen by diﬀerent governments. In this case,
early contributions have identiﬁed a tendency for a race to the top on trans-
fer pricing limits that are chosen non cooperatively by governments that can
enforce them(Mansori and Weichenrieder, 1999, and Raimondos-Møller and
Sharf, 2002). This race to the top result was later challenged by, e.g., Kind et
al. (2004), Peralta et al. (2006), Bucovetsky and Hauﬂer (2008), who model
competing governments facing ﬁrms who optimize their tax bills in response
to proﬁt tax rates.3
As e c o n dr e s p o n s et op r o ﬁ ts h i f t i n gi st h eformula apportionment to al-
locate the consolidated proﬁt of the multinational ﬁrm across diﬀerent tax
jurisdiction,regardless of the location of origin, according to a pre-agreed for-
mula. The European Commission has proposed to use this solution with the
apportionment based on the proportion of total sales that take place in each
country. The problem is that this solution provides a bad approximation of
proﬁt if the proﬁt margin is diﬀerent and variable across countries. Secondly,
it opens up the scope for misreporting or restructuring sales across divisions
to reduce the tax liability. Thirdly, the low-tax jurisdiction are likely to dis-
agree with this formula apportionment because it will remove the possibility
of reaping proﬁt from high-tax jurisdictions. Given that small countries will
get smaller proportion of total sales, and that they are also low-tax jurisdic-
tion, we should expect disagreement from them.
In this contribution, we will analyze the implications of some alternative
solutions that could be accepted by all tax jurisdictions with diﬀerent taxes
and market sizes. When several national ﬁscal authorities share a mobile tax
base, one country’s tax rate changes the tax base of the other, thus creating
a ﬁscal externality which leads to sub-optimal outcomes. The ﬁscal compe-
tition literature has identiﬁed this ﬁscal externality and, more importantly,
proposed several policies to curb its negative eﬀects. Full tax harmoniza-
tion, tax ﬂoors, tax ranges (Oshawa, 2003, Peralta and van Ypersele, 2006),
central government’s matching grants (De Pater and Myers, 1994, Wildasin,
the proﬁt of the user.
3Other references modeling competing governments include Elitzur and Mintz (1996)
and Kind et al. (2004), who recognize the use of transfer pricing as a means to give the
appropriate incentives to subsidiaries, and Hauﬂer and Schjelderup (2000). Nielsen et
al. (2003, 2005) and Schjelderup and Weichenrieder (1999) focus on the use of transfer
prices as a proﬁt shifting and/or incentive device in diﬀerent product market and tax
system contexts, and multinational organizational forms, without modeling competing
governments.
21989), and tax equalization or revenue sharing and matching grants agree-
ments (Boadway and Flatters, 1982, Hindriks and Myles, 2003, Hindriks,
Peralta and Weber, 2008, Dr` eze, Figui` eres and Hindriks. 2008) are among
the policies that have been put forward by the literature. However, despite
the pervasive evidence about the increasing importance of multinational ﬁrms
in the globalized economy and on their capacity to restructure ﬁnancial ﬂows
across divisions to reduces tax liability, the study of corrective devices in se-
tups in which countries compete for the proﬁts of multinationals has not
been studied so far. This paper concentrates on the use of revenue sharing
agreements with a comparison with tax harmonization.
Many federal countries, such as Canada, Australia, Denmark and Switzer-
land, and many developing countries (Smart, 1996, Ahmad and Thomas,
1996, Shah, 2004) run equalization schemes whereby a central government
transfers resources between jurisdictions. The European Union’s Structural
Funds (the Development Fund, the Social Fund, the Financial Instrument for
Fisheries Guidance and the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantees
Fund) are an example of revenue sharing among sovereign states.4 Another
example is Germany, where in addition to the transfers from the Federal to
State governments, there exists a scheme of transfers across states. Payments
out of states with more than average revenue per capita into those with less
than average amount to 25 million Euros in 1996 (Spahn and F¨ ottinger,
1997). In the US, the state tax sharing is one of two forms of state intergov-
ernmental aid to local governments. Data show that state intergovernmental
aid by each state to its local governments (combined city and county) is the
largest element of state expenditures. In 2000 the share of state intergovern-
mental expenditures in state general revenue was on average 33.2% in the US,
and the average for the Southern states was 29.9%. This intergovernmental
expenditures includes grant-in-aid, shared taxes and reimbursement for the
cost of certain programs carried out by localities. From 1985 to 2000, pay-
ments to local governments have remained at an almost constant percentage
of total general expenditures (32% to 35 %).5
Although these schemes’ alleged purpose is to equalize the citizens ac-
cess to public services across jurisdictions, i.e., correct ﬁscal imbalances, the
literature has identiﬁed the potential eﬃciency gains from their implemen-
tation. The seminal contribution by Boadway and Flatters (1982),6 shows
4The EU’s structural funds amount to one third of the EU budget between 2000 and
2006 (European Communities, 2004). This ﬁgure does not include the Common Agricul-
tural Policy.
5Fiscal year 2000 data is from the US Bureau of the Census,
http://www.census.gov/govs/www/estimate.
6See also Stiglitz (1983) and Dahlby and Wilson (1994).
3that ﬁscal equalization schemes can generate eﬃciency gains by internaliz-
ing the ﬁscal externality (through federal transfers equal to the diﬀerence
between a jurisdiction’s actual source-based revenue and the average level
of the federation). While Boadway and Flatters (1982) assumed the lack of
jurisdictions’ incentives to alter tax rates in response to equalization policies,
it has been later shown that the eﬃciency gains carry over in the case of ﬁs-
cal response to equalization policies.7 Then the federal planner may design
intergovernmental transfers to implement the eﬃcient tax rates at the local
level.8 However, unless there exist lump sum transfers at the federal level,
there is no guarantee that all jurisdictions would beneﬁt from such transfers
and would implement it on a voluntary basis. To address the issue of vol-
untary participation, Hindriks and Myles (2003) have shown that symmetric
jurisdictions, while competing for a mobile tax base, can voluntarily agree to
share revenue as a strategic device to limit harmful tax competition. When
countries are heterogenous, notably in terms of ﬁscal revenue, it is no longer
clear that they could all beneﬁt from revenue sharing arrangements. Those
with low ﬁscal revenue would beneﬁt while those with high ﬁscal revenue
could bear disproportionate shares of the ﬁscal burden (Hindriks, Peralta
and Weber, 2008).
To make the argument as clear as possible, we will develop a simple model.
We consider a world of two countries tha diﬀer in market size with two multi-
national ﬁrms that own division in each country, and compete locally on each
market ` a la Cournot. Countries set source-based proﬁt taxes on the proﬁt
that multinational ﬁrms choose to report in each division. Countries compete
in tax rates anticipating the resulting production decision and the proﬁt re-
ported by each multinational divisions. In the presence of tax diﬀerential,
multinational ﬁrms shift proﬁts from the high to the low tax country at
some cost. We follow Kind et al. (2004, 2005) and impose a convex conceal-
ment cost.9 We show that countries will both undertax in equilibrium, and
that the small country (i.e., smaller market size) will tax less in equilibrium
reaping some of the proﬁt from the big country. This tax-cutting strategy
will reduce the ﬁscal gap between the two countries. We show that imposing
tax harmonization may hurt the small country. We then show that a revenue
7See, e.g., Bird and Slack (1990), Wildasin (1991), Smart (1998), Koethenbuerger
(2002), Bucovetsky and Smart (2006), Figui` eres et al. (2004).
8There is also some empirical literature on the relationship between intergovernmental
transfers and local tax eﬀort: Buettner (2005), Dahlby and Warren (2003), Baretti et al.
(2003), Hepp and von Hagen (2001), among others. A more theoretical paper is Bordignon
et al. (2001) who show how intergovernmental transfers aﬀect tax enforcement.
9See also Nielsen et al. (2005), Peralta et al. (2006), Amerighi and Peralta (2008). and
Swenson (2001)
4sharing scheme will increase equilibrium taxes and reduce the tax diﬀerential.
More surprisingly we show that both countries would beneﬁt from sharing an
equal proportion of their own ﬁscal revenue. This result hold true regardless
of the extent of the diﬀerence in market sizes. With this revenue sharing,
the big country transfers more ﬁscal resources to the small country than it
receives, but in exchange it beneﬁts from the reduction in the tax diﬀerential
and the harmful proﬁt shifting.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a presentation of the
model. Section 3 characterizes the tax equilibrium outcome and discusses
the implications of tax harmonization. Section 4 analyses the consequences of
revenue sharing on equilibrium taxes and the ﬁscal revenues of each country.
Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 The model
There are two countries, 1 and 2, where (inverse) demands are linear, and
given by
p1 = γ1 − βq1 and p2 = γ2 − βq2,γ 1 ≥ γ2 (1)
Country 1 is therefore the big country, with a higher demand for the good.
There are two multinational ﬁrms, owning one branch in each country,
which compete ` a la Cournot in each market. The unit production cost is
normalized to zero; so is the cost to ship goods across countries.10 In addition,
ﬁrms may shift proﬁts across locations, in order to minimize their tax liability,
at a cost. More precisely, letting π
j
i be the proﬁt eﬀectively generated by ﬁrm
j = a,b in country i =1 ,2, the ﬁrm must decide how much proﬁt to declare
in country i,˜ π
j
i,g i v e nt h ec o n s t r a i n t˜ π
j
1 +˜ π
j
2 = π
j
1 + π
j
2.W ef o l l o wK i n de t
al. (2004, 2005) and introduce a convex non-ﬁscally deductible concealment
cost, given by for i =1 ,2a n dj = a,b
C
￿
π
j
i, ˜ π
j
i
￿
=2 δ
￿
π
j
i − ˜ π
j
i
￿2
Hence, the parameter δ is a scaling factor of the cost of restructuring ﬁnancial
ﬂows across divisions to shift proﬁts to the low-tax jurisdiction.11 This may
either reﬂect the cost of hiring accounting experts in charge of producing
10One can think of each ﬁrm having its headquarters in one of the countries, although the
distinction between headquarters and aﬃliate is immaterial here for we are not modeling
transportation costs. One could easily add transport costs to the model without changing
the main results.
11See also Nielsen et al. (2005), Peralta et al. (2006), Amerighi and Peralta (2008), and
Swenson (2001).
5the necessary documents to sustain the declared proﬁts, or an expected ﬁne
to be paid to the government. The parameter δ may reﬂect the degree of
enforcement of the transfer pricing rules: weaker enforcement implies smaller
δ.
Government i set a source-based tax rate ti on proﬁt reported within its
tax-jurisdiction by both multinational ﬁrms, and its ﬁscal revenu is given by
Ri = ti
￿
˜ π
a
i +˜ π
b
i
￿
= ti ˜ πi
To concentrate on the key issues which is the problem of local taxation of
global corporation, we will consider that governements seek to maximize
ﬁscal revenue.12 We assume that ti ≤ 1,for i =1 ,2. This is the equivalent of
a free disposal assumption in our setting, or it may reﬂect an alternative free
trade area where the multinational ﬁrms can locate and enjoy zero proﬁts.
The sequence of event is the following. First, both countries choose si-
multaneously and independently their tax rates so as to maximize their tax
revenue. Second, given tax choices, multinational ﬁrms compete ` a la Cournot
on each local market and chooses how much to produce in each country and
how much proﬁt to shift in the low-tax jurisdiction.
We will later introduce the possibility for countries to share a uniform
proportion 0 ≤ α<1/2 of their own ﬁscal revenue with each other. In that
case, country i =1 ,2’s ﬁscal revenue becomes
Ri(α)=( 1− α)ti ˜ πi + αt j ˜ πj,j ￿= i (2)
2.1 The ﬁrms’ decision
Proceeding backwards, we analyze production decisions in each country given
the tax choices. The ﬁrms decide the quantities to produce in each market
and the amount of proﬁt shifting. Given the non-deductibility of cost of
proﬁt shifting cost, the ﬁrms’ production decisions are independent of tax
rates (maximizing before and after taxes proﬁts is equivalent). The problem
of ﬁrm a is to maximize (1 − t1)˜ πa
1 +( 1− t2)˜ πa
2 − 2δ(πa
1 − ˜ πa
1)2,s u b j e c tt o
12The assumption of revenue maximizing government is a shortcut for describing a
situation where residents care suﬃciently about the provision of public goods that are
ﬁnanced by tax revenues (see Kanbur and Keen, 1993). What is the appropriate objective
function for the principal is ultimately an empirical question. However, it can be argued
that if the government maximizes a social welfare function with redistributive objective
in mind, then, under revenue constraints, in some cases the optimal policy must be net
revenue maximizing. This is true if the welfare gains from higher net revenue are suﬃcient
to oﬀset the losses in welfare due to a net revenue maximizing policy (see Chander and
Wilde, 1998).
6˜ πa
1 +˜ πa
2 = p1(qa
1 + qb
1)qa
1 + p2(qa
2 + qb
2)qa
2, with the inverse demand function
given by (1). This is equivalent to
max
qa
1,qa
2,˜ πa
1
(1 − t1)˜ π
a
1 +( 1− t2)
￿
(γ1 − β(q
a
1 + q
b
1))q
a
1 +( γ2 − β(q
a
2 + q
b
2))q
a
2 − ˜ π
a
1
￿
− 2δ
￿
(γ1 − β(q
a
1 + q
b
1))q
a
1 − ˜ π
a
1
￿2
We show in Appendix A that the ﬁrm’s reaction functions are given by
q
j
1 =
γ1 − βqk
1
2β
,q
j
2 =
γ2 − βqk
2
2β
,j∈{ a,b},j￿= k
And the reported proﬁts are
˜ π
j
1 =( γ1 − β(q
j
1 + q
k
1))q
j
1 −
t1 − t2
4δ
,j∈{ a,b},j￿= k
˜ π
j
2 =( γ2 − β(q
j
2 + q
k
2))q
j
2 −
t2 − t1
4δ
,j∈{ a,b},j￿= k
Hence equilibrium quantities are qa
1 = qb
1 = γ1/(3β), and qa
2 = qb
2 =
γ2/(3β), yielding equilibrium prices p1 = γ1/3a n dp2 = γ2/3, and the total
proﬁt reported in country i ˜ πb
i +˜ πa
i is
˜ πi =2
γ2
i
9β
− 2
ti − tj
4δ
,i=1 ,2,j￿= i
We can normalize production assuming γ1 = 3
2
￿
β(1 + ￿),γ 2 = 3
2
￿
β(1 − ￿),
so that
˜ π1 =
1+￿
2
−
t1 − t2
2δ
and similarly for country 2,
˜ π2 =
1 − ￿
2
−
t2 − t1
2δ
The aggregate proﬁt is therefore equal to 1 regardless of the tax choices,
making the tax game a simple zero-sum game. Note that for identical taxes
t1 = t2 the distribution of aggregate proﬁts between the two countreis is
entirely determined by the market size parameter, i.e., ˜ π1(t,t)=( 1+￿)/2
. Note also that given the normalization of the production, the market size
parameter must satisfy ￿ ∈ [0,1].
As a benchmark for the tax competition game, notice that if countries
cooperate, they would maximize the joint ﬁscal revenue
t1
￿
1+￿
2
−
t1 − t2
2δ
￿
+ t2
￿
1 − ￿
2
−
t2 − t1
2δ
￿
which leads to the optimal tax harmonization to
1 = to
2 = 1, and maximal joint
ﬁscal revenue equal to 1.
73 Tax competition
We now move to the tax game. We ﬁrst assume no revenue sharing. The
government of country 1 chooses t1 to maximize
R1 = t1
￿
1+￿
2
−
t1 − t2
2δ
￿
The ﬁrst-order condition is
dR1
dt1
=
1+￿
2
−
t1 − t2
2δ
−
t1
2δ
=0 ( 3 )
Analogously, the ﬁrst-order condition for country 2 is
dR2
dt2
=
1 − ￿
2
−
t2 − t1
2δ
−
t2
2δ
=0 ( 4 )
It is interesting to note that (3) and (4) are analogous up to the ﬁrst constant,
which is higher for the country 1 (with larger market), implying that, for
equal tax rates, the big country has greater incentive to tax than the small
one.13
Solving the ﬁrst-order conditions, one obtains the best replies14
ˆ t1(t2)=δ
1+￿
2
+
t2
2
, and ˆ t2(t1)=δ
1 − ￿
2
+
t1
2
Taxes are strategic complements: if, say, country 2 increases its tax rate, the
tax base of country 1 increases, thus increasing country 1’s incentive to tax.
The intersection of the two best replies gives the Nash equilibrium taxes,
t
∗
1 = δ
￿
1+
￿
3
￿
and t
∗
2 = δ
￿
1 −
￿
3
￿
To insure interior solution to the tax game, we assume in the rest of the
analysis that
δ ≤ ¯ δ =
3
3+￿
≤ 1
13It is worth pointing out that the heterogeneity between countries makes the ﬁrms
more inclined to declare proﬁts in one of the countries but does not aﬀect the perceived
elasticity of the tax base in the diﬀerent countries. In standard tax competition models it
is the asymmetry in the perceived elasticity of the tax base which is the driving force in
generating the asymmetric choice of taxes (see Hauﬂer, 2001).
14Notice that the revenue function is concave in the tax rate, d2R1/dt2
1 = −1/δ < 0s o
the existence of equilibrium is ensured.
8This equivalent to say that the proﬁt shifting issues is eﬀectively binding and
limits governments’ tax choices.
It is worth noting that tax competition induces a net loss of tax base
(relative to tax harmonization) for the big country which is taxing more in
equilibrium. The tax rate diﬀerence is t∗
1 − t∗
2 =2 δ￿/3i m p l y i n gt h a tb o t h
ﬁrms shift proﬁts from the big to the small country. However, this proﬁt
shifting is not enough to cancel out the market size eﬀect, and the big country
ends up with larger tax base in equilibrium,
˜ π
∗
1 =
1
2
+
￿
6
, ˜ π
∗
2 =
1
2
−
￿
6
With a larger tax base and a higher tax rate, the big country also ends up
with higher ﬁscal revenue in equilibrium,
R
∗
1 =
δ
18
(3 + ￿)
2,R
∗
2 =
δ
18
(3 − ￿)
2
Naturally, the cost of shifting proﬁt measured by δ, has an impact on the
level of taxes in equilibrium: lower δ exacerbates the tax competition be-
tween countries and reduces the equilibrium taxes and joint tax revenue. It
is straightforward to conclude that joint tax revenue is smaller in the com-
petitive outcome than under the cooperative outcome for δ<¯ δ.
This allows us to state our ﬁrst proposition
Proposition 3.1 Suppose ￿ ≤ 1 and δ ≤ ¯ δ. Then, in the Nash equilibrium,
there is under-taxation and joint tax revenue is sub-optimal. If the proﬁt
shifting becomes more costly (i.e., if δ increases) Nash equilibrium taxes in-
crease, and so does joint tax revenue.
Another question is whether each country would beneﬁt from cooperation
in the absence of transfers, that is, if they both set the cooperative tax rates
to
1 = to
2 =1a n dg e tt h er e s p e c t i v et a xr e v e n u e ,i . e . ,Ro
1 =( 1+￿)/2, Ro
2 =
(1−￿)/2.15 Comparing this cooperative outcome with the Nash equilibrium
outcome, we get the following result.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose ￿<1 and δ ≤ ¯ δ. Moving towards optimal (har-
monized) taxes increases the tax revenue of the big country and has ambiguous
eﬀect on the tax revenue of the small country. However there exists δ∗ < ¯ δ,
such that the tax revenue of the small country decreases under tax harmo-
nization, when δ>δ ∗.
15It is straightforward that there is a cooperative tax revenue split that beneﬁts both
countries. We concentrate here on the no transfer benchmark.
9The potential advantage of the small country is its lower tax rate, which
allows to reap a fraction ￿/3 of the big country tax base. With tax harmo-
nization, this is no longer possible. Thus unless the ﬁscal competition is too
intense and leads to very low tax rates in both countries, the small coun-
try prefers the competition outcome to the tax harmonization outcome. The
intensity of tax competition is inversely proportional to the proﬁt shiﬁtng
parameter δ so that for suﬃcently high δ>δ ∗ the small country prefers
competiion to cooperation. The fact that small countries tax less, and may
end up beneﬁting from tax competition, has already been established in cap-
ital tax competition literature (Bucovetsky, 1991, Wilson, 1991). In this
literature, the small country taxes less due to its smaller market power in
the international capital markets.16
Summing up, tax competition leads to ineﬃciently low taxes, with the big
country getting more tax revenue than the small country. Cooperation via
tax harmonization is diﬃcult because the small country could end up worse
oﬀ with tax cooperation than with tax competition. So the small country
has no incentive to cooperate. The next section analyse the impact of the
revenue sharing arrangement on the equilibrium outcome to see whether both
countries could beneﬁt from such arrangement. Obviously if tax harmoniza-
tion is beneﬁcial to the small country, then the revenue sharing arrangement
is no longer needed. So what we propose is a solution to the tax competition
problems that can usefully complement the tax harmonization solution.
4 Introducing revenue sharing
We now let each country share a proportion α (with 0 ≤ α<1/2) of its own
tax revenue with the other, according to (2).
4.1 Equilibrium taxes with revenue sharing
Computing the ﬁrst-order conditions for the two countries and solving yields
the following best-replies
ˆ t1(t2;α)=δ
1+￿
2
+
t2
2(1 − α)
, and ˆ t2(t1;α)=δ
1 − ￿
2
+
t1
2(1 − α)
16According to the small country advantage obtained by these authors, the small country
has a higher payoﬀ than the big country in the tax competition equilibrium, and they have
equal ones in the cooperative outcome. In the current setup, the big country has a higher
ﬁscal revenue than the small one both in the competitive equilibrium and the cooperative
outcome but the small country gains when moving from cooperation to competition.
10Figure 1: Tax Choice
t2(t1;!=0 )
t1(t2;!=0 )
t1(t2;!>0)
t2(t1;!>0)
t1
t2
Note that taxes are strategic complements, and the eﬀect of revenue shar-
ing is to reinforce this strategic complementarity.17 For α<1/2t h es l o p e so f
the tax responses are less than one. Strategic complementarity is reinforced
because revenue sharing smoothes out the impact of each country’s tax rate
change on its own tax revenue.18
Figure 1 illustrates the tax response functions.
Solving for the Nash equilibrium tax rates, and simplifying, yields
t
∗
1(α)=δ(1−α)
￿
1
1 − 2α
+
￿
3 − 2α
￿
, and t
∗
2(α)=δ(1−α)
￿
1
1 − 2α
−
￿
3 − 2α
￿
Note that we get interior solution if
δ<¯ δ(α)=
(3 − 2α)(1 − 2α)
((3 − 2α)+￿(1 − 2α))(1 − α)
≤ 1, for0 ≤ ￿ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ α<1/2
(5)
so that the cost of proﬁt shifting must be suﬃciently low to limit the tax
choices of governments.
17It is straightforward to obtain that d2Ri/dt2
i = −(1 − α)/δ, hence the existence of
equilibrium is ensured for α ≤ 1.
18Algebraically,
dˆ t1(t2;α)
dt2
= −
d
2R1(α)
dt1dt2
d2R1(α)
dt2
1
=
1/(2δ)
(1 − α)/δ
11Note that the big country’s tax rate is higher than the small one’s (see
Baldwin and Krugman, 2004 and Krogstrup, 2003), and, for 0 ≤ ￿ ≤ 1, we
have
δ
1 − α
1 − 2α
≤ t
∗
1(α) ≤ δ
4(1 − α)2
(1 − 2α)(3 − 2α)
δ
2(1 − α)
(1 − 2α)(3 − 2α)
≤ t
∗
2(α) ≤ δ
1 − α
1 − 2α
hence, both tax rates are positive.
4.2 Eﬃciency and equalizing eﬀects of revenue sharing
The interesting question is the extent to which revenue sharing may improve
upon the tax competition outcome. More speciﬁcally, we analyse the impact
of increasing revenue sharing on joint tax revenue and on the tax revenue in
each country. We also analyse its potential equalizing eﬀect by reducing the
ﬁscal imbalances.
Firstly, it is straightforward to show that both taxes increase in the degree
of revenue sharing,
dt∗
1(α)
dα
= δ
￿
1
(1 − 2α)2 −
￿
(3 − 2α)2
￿
> 0, for￿<1( 6 )
dt∗
2(α)
dα
= δ
￿
1
(1 − 2α)2 +
￿
(3 − 2α)2
￿
> 0( 7 )
This positive impact on equilibrium tax rates is the result of the reinforced
strategic complementarity. By reducing (in absolute value) the own tax eﬀect
on marginal revenue, revenue sharing induces countries to set higher taxes.
This eﬀect is reminiscent of country’s market power in capital tax competition
models. In such settings, the international capital price absorbs part of a
given country’s tax increase, provided that countries are large enough to
have market power on the price of capital . Hence, for suﬃciently large
countries, the tax base of a given country becomes less elastic with respect
to to its own tax rate, thereby increasing Nash equilibrium tax rates.
It is also immediate from (6) and (7) that the impact of revenue sharing
is greater for the small than for the big country, so that the tax gap actually
shrinks and tax choices converge with the degree of revenue sharing. This
implies that revenue sharing reallocate tax base (proﬁt) from the (low-tax)
small to the (high-tax) big country.
We summarize these ﬁndings in the next proposition.
12Proposition 4.1 Suppose ￿ ≤ 1 and δ ≤ ¯ δ(α). Increased revenue sharing
increases the tax rates of both countries. In addition, the tax gap decreases,
causing a redistribution of the tax base from the (low tax) small to the (high
tax) big country.
Interestingly, since the amount of proﬁts shifted from the low to the
high tax country is proportional to the tax diﬀerence, the lower tax gap
induces the ﬁrms to reduce proﬁt shifting. Given that proﬁt shifting is costly,
revenue sharing has the advantage of reducing the incentive for ﬁrms to waste
ressources on proﬁt shifting. Under revenue sharing, the declared proﬁts in
each country are respectively given by
˜ π1 =
1
2
￿
1+
￿
3 − 2α
￿
≥ 0
˜ π2 =
1
2
￿
1 −
￿
3 − 2α
￿
≥ 0, for0 ≤ ￿ ≤ 1
from which it is clear that increased revenue sharing transfers resources from
the low-tax jurisdiction (country 2) to the high-tax jurisdiction ( country 1).
The fact that both tax rates increase with the degree of revenue sharing,
and that the overall tax base is ﬁxed, implies that revenue sharing increases
the joint tax revenue. Indeed, straightforward algebra shows that
R
∗
1(α)=δ
1 − α
2
￿
1
1 − 2α
+
2(1 − α)
3 − 2α
￿ +
1
(3 − 2α)2￿
2
￿
, and
R
∗
2(α)=δ
1 − α
2
￿
1
1 − 2α
−
2(1 − α)
3 − 2α
￿ +
1
(3 − 2α)2￿
2
￿
so that total ﬁscal revenue is
R
∗
1(α)+R
∗
2(α)=δ(1 − α)
￿
1
1 − 2α
+
1
(3 − 2α)2￿
2
￿
and the impact of revenue sharing is then
d(R∗
1(α)+R∗
2(α))
dα
= δ
￿
1
(1 − 2α)2 +
(1 − 2α)
(3 − 2α)3￿
2
￿
> 0
What about the impact of revenue sharing for each country separately?
Notice that one may rewrite tax revenue of country i =1 ,2a s
Ri(α)=ti˜ πi + α(tj˜ πj − ti˜ πi),i=1 ,2,j￿= i (8)
13The ﬁrst term is the pre-sharing tax revenue. This term is increasing for
the big country, given that both its tax rate and its tax base are increasing
with revenue sharing. As regards the small country, although its tax rate is
increasing in α, its tax base is reduced (due to the smaller tax gap), hence
the impact is, a priori, ambiguous. Note, however, that the ﬁnal division of
the tax base depends entirely on the tax diﬀerential, which is less sensitive
to revenue sharing than own tax rate change. It is therefore not surprising
that the tax rate increase dominates the tax base loss, and
d(t∗
2(α)˜ π∗
2(α))
dα
= δ
￿
1
2(1 − 2α)2 −
4(1 − α)￿
2(1 − 2α)2(3 − 2α)2 +
(1 − 2α)￿2
2(3 − 2α)3
￿
>δ
￿
1
2(1 − 2α)2 −
4(1 − α)
2(1 − 2α)2(3 − 2α)2
￿
= δ
￿
3 − 4α(2 − α)
2(1 − 2α)2(3 − 2α)2
￿
> 0
Hence, pre-sharing tax revenues increase with revenue sharing in both coun-
tries.
The second term in (8) is the net transfer between countries involved
by the revenue sharing. The small country has smaller revenue and so is
an e tb e n e ﬁ c i a r yo ft h er e v e n u es h a r i n g ,w h e r e a st h eb i gc o u n t r yi san e t
contributor to the scheme. Formally, the ﬁscal revenue diﬀerential is given
by,
t
∗
1(α)˜ π
∗
1(α) − t
∗
2(α)˜ π
∗
2(α)=δ￿
2(1 − α)2
3 − 4α(2 − α)
> 0
and the net transfer α[t∗
1(α)˜ π∗
1(α) − t∗
2(α)˜ π∗
2(α)] is increasing in the degree
of revenue sharing, since
d[(t∗
1(α)˜ π∗
1(α) − t∗
2(α)˜ π∗
2(α))]
dα
= δ￿
4(1 − α)
(3 − 4α(2 − α))2 > 0
That is the own-tax revenue diﬀerential is increasing with revenue sharing
(in spite of the convergence in tax rates). It is then evident that the small
country always beneﬁts from increasing revenue sharing: both its pre-sharing
tax revenue and the net transfers from the bigh country increase with revenue
sharing.
Another question pertains to the equalizing eﬀect of revenue sharing.
Notice that ∆(α)=R∗
1(α) − R∗
2(α)=( 1− 2α)(t∗
1(α)˜ π∗
1(α) − t∗
2(α)˜ π∗
2(α)).
On the one hand, increasing revenue sharing implies that countries retain
ad e c r e a s i n gp a r to ft h e i ro w nt a xr e v e n u e ;o nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,t h eo w n -
tax revenue diﬀerential is increasing in the degree of revenue sharing. It
turns out that the ﬁrst eﬀect always dominates the second, so that revenue
14sharing has an overall ﬁscal equalization eﬀect. Indeed, after straightforward
simpliﬁcation,
d∆(α)
dα
= −4δ￿
(2 − α)(1 − α)
(3 − 2α)2 < 0
The discussion above allows us to establish the following result.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose that ￿ ≤ 1 and δ ≤ ¯ δ(α). The joint tax revenue
increases with revenue sharing whereas the ﬁscal imbalances shrinks. More-
over, the tax revenue of the small country increases with revenue sharing.
Thus the small country gains from revenue sharing because the reduction
of its tax base is more than oﬀset by the increase of its tax rate and the net
transfer received from the big country. Obviously, the fact that total ﬁscal
revenue increases with revenue sharing is a necessary but not a suﬃcient
condition for the big country to gain from revenue sharing. Fiscal revenue in
the big country is the sum of its pre-sharing revenue and the net transfer. The
ﬁrst term is increasing with revenue sharing because both the tax rate and
tax base increase. It is possible to show that this beneﬁt always dominates
the cost of the net transfer to the small country, so that the big country also
beneﬁts from revenue sharing.
Proposition 4.3 Suppose that ￿ ≤ 1 and δ ≤ ¯ δ(α). The tax revenue of the
big country increases with revenue sharing. The beneﬁt from revenue sharing
to the big country is smaller the greater the degree of heterogeneity between
the countries.
When country heterogeneity is small, the net transfer is also small and the
beneﬁt of revenue sharing is to limit the harmful tax competition. When the
countries are very heterogeneous, the result stems from the tax gap, which is
proportional to ￿.R e d u c i n gt h i sg a pc a u s e sab i gi n ﬂ o wo ft a xb a s e( p r o ﬁ t )
to the big country. To ﬁx idea, consider that the heterogeneity is at its max-
imum value ￿ =1a n dc o n s i d e rt h en o - r e v e n u es h a r i n go u t c o m e . W ek n o w
from Section 3 that t∗
1 =4 δ/3a n dt∗
2 =2 δ/3, leading to a distribution of tax
base of 2/3f o rt h eb i ga n d1 /3f o rt h es m a l lc o u n t r y ,r e s p e c t i v e l y( c o m p a r e d
to zero tax base in the smal country with equal taxes). Actually, the agres-
siveness of the small country in the tax competition game is proportional
to the extent of heterogeneity, which leads to a greater loss of tax base for
the big country when heterogeneity is high. Introducing a small amount of
revenue sharing in this setting increases t∗
1 by 8δ/9a n dt∗
2 by 10δ/9,t h u s
leading to a transfer of tax revenue from the small to the big country of 1/9,
at a negligeable cost of a net transfer close to 0.
15Figure 2: The impact of revenue sharing
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The simulations use the following parameter values: ￿ =1 ,δ=0 .15.
Figure 2 shows how the tax revenue of the small and the big countries
increase, and tax rates increase and converge, with α,i nt h es p e c i ﬁ cc a s eo f
￿ =1 . 19
To summarize, revenue sharing raises the joint tax revenue and reduces
the ﬁscal imbalances between countries, implying that the small country
beneﬁts from revenue sharing. This is not so surprising. Perhaps more
surprising is the result that the big country also beneﬁts from revenue sharing,
even if its ﬁscal capacity is much larger. In this case the eﬃciency gain (i.e.,
relaxing harmful tax competition) from revenue sharing outweighs the cost
of transferring resources to the small country.
The alternative solution to tax competition is tax harmonization. Could
it be beneﬁcial to each country? We have already established in Proposition
?? that the fully cooperative outcome is not always benﬁcial to the small
country. We now tackle a milder form of tax harmonization, namely, of the
following form:
t(λ)=λt
∗
1 +( 1− λ)t
∗
2
with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. So the uniform tax rate is a convex combination of the
equilibrium tax rates. With high λ there is harmonization on the highest tax
rate and with low λ there is harmonization on the lowest tax rate. We have
the following result
Proposition 4.4 Suppose that ￿ ≤ 1 and δ ≤ ¯ δ(α). Suppose there is no
revenue sharing (α =0 )and there is tax harmonization in the form of convex
19The mobility of the tax base is set to δ =0 .15. Please note that this is just a
multiplicative factor in equilibrium tax rates and ﬁscal revenues, and is immaterial to the
results. The value used does ensure that the boundary condition (5) is respected.
16combination between the highest and lowest equilibrium taxes. Then there
exists no harmonized tax rate that could beneﬁt the small country.
The reason is that the small country loses its tax base as a result of tax
harmonization. With harmonization to the bottom, λ → 0, the small country
gets smaller tax base but taxes the same in equilibrium, which lowers its tax
revenue. Contrarily, with harmonization to the top λ → 1,t h eb i gc o u n t r y
is better oﬀ because it will get greater tax base, while taxing the same in
equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
Globalization with the expansion of the reach of global corporation un-
dermines the capacity of local governments to tax corporate income. With
division in so many diﬀerent countries, those corporations do not need to
physically change location to get a more favorable tax treatment. They can
more easily restructure their ﬁnancial ﬂows across divisions to exploit the
tax loopholes in the diﬀerent locations. Global corporations can use transfer
pricing to obtain favorable tax treatment of proﬁt. With no limitation on
transfer pricing the ﬁrms will set extreme value to shift as much proﬁt as
possible to the low-tax jurisdiction. This process undermines the capacity
to tax corporate income and encourages tax competition to reap the corpo-
rate income from other jurisdictions. One solution is to set limits on transfer
pricing but those limits are hard to ﬁx and diﬃcult to enforce. The second
solution, recommended by the European Commission, is the formula appor-
tionment rules that aggregate corporate income regardless of location and
distribute the tax base across jurisdiction according to some ﬁxed rules. The
apportionment rule proposed by the European Commission is based on the
proportion of total sales generated in each jurisdiction. The implementation
of this rule may not be acceptable by all jurisdictions, notably the small ju-
risdiction with low corporates taxes and small proportion of total sales. This
paper tackles this issue by proposing another solution which is the revenue
sharing scheme. We analyze the impact of revenue sharing on corporate tax
competition between heterogeneous countries. We show that revenue sharing
is desirable in a variety of settings, both for the federation as a whole as for
each country individually, even for the country which is a net contributor
to the system. We also show that revenue sharing is preferred by the small
countries to the tax harmonization, and that revenue sharing reduces the
ﬁscal imbalances across countries.
Our results suggest a complement to the policy instruments used to mit-
igate the harmful consequences of proﬁt shifting and corporate tax compe-
17tition. Given the classical divide between the big high-tax jurisdictions and
the small low-tax jurisdictions, revenue sharing can oﬀer a way out. The big
jurisdiction beneﬁts from revenue sharing because it limits the harmful tax
competition from the small jurisdiction. The small jurisdiction beneﬁts from
revenue sharing because it gets more revenue from the big jurisdiction than
they pay to it. In a context of increasing globalization and the development
of global corporation, the capacity to restructure ﬁnancial ﬂows to exploit
tax diﬀerence across location is likely to increase and the outcome where the
small gets to increasingly more capital is a possibility.
Appendices
Appendix A – The Cournot with proﬁt shifting equilib-
rium
The ﬁrst order condition for ˜ πa
1 is
−t1 + t2 +4 δ
￿
(γ1 − β(q
a
1 + q
b
1))q
a
1 − ˜ π
a
1
￿
=0 ( 9 )
from which one obtains
˜ π
a
1 =( γ1 − β(q
a
1 + q
b
1))q
a
1 −
t1 − t2
4δ
i.e., the ﬁrm declares the proﬁt actually realized minus a term which depends
negatively on the tax disadvantage of country 1; this last term is decreasing
with the cost to shift proﬁts, δ.
As regards the choice of qa
1,w eh a v e
(1−t2)
￿
γ1 − 2βq
a
1 − βq
b
1
￿
−4δ
￿
(γ1 − β(q
a
1 + q
b
1))q
a
1 − ˜ π
a
1
￿￿
γ1 − 2βq
a
1 − βq
b
1
￿
=0
which, using (9), may be written as
(1 − t2 − t2 + t1)
￿
γ1 − 2βq
a
1 − βq
b
1
￿
=0 ,
yielding the reaction function
q
a
1 =
γ1 − βqb
1
2β
(10)
Finally, the quantity sold in market 2 solves
(1 − t2)[γ2 − 2βq
a
2 − βq
b
2]=0
18yielding the reaction function
q
a
2 =
γ2 − βqb
2
2β
(11)
Solving the analogous program for ﬁrm b,w eg e tt h ed e c l a r e dp r o ﬁ t
˜ π
b
1 =( γ1 − β(q
a
1 + q
b
1))q
b
1 −
t1 − t2
4δ
and the quantity reaction functions
q
b
1 =
γ1 − βqa
1
2β
and q
b
2 =
γ2 − βqa
2
2β
(12)
Hence equilibrium quantities are qa
2 = qb
2 = γ2/(3β), and qa
1 = qb
1 =
γ1/(3β), yielding equilibrium prices p1 = γ1/3a n dp2 = γ2/3. The proﬁt
declared in country 1 is then
˜ π
a
1 =
γ2
1
9β
−
t1 − t2
4δ
and we may use ˜ πa
1 +˜ πa
2 =( γ1 −β(qa
1 +qb
1))qa
1 +(γ2 −β(qa
2 +qb
2))qa
2 to obtain
˜ π
a
2 =
γ2
2
9β
−
t2 − t1
4δ
and analogously for ﬁrm b we have
˜ π
b
1 =
γ2
1
9β
−
t1 − t2
4δ
, and ˜ π
b
2 =
γ2
2
9β
−
t2 − t1
4δ
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 3.2: It is straightforward to obtain
R
∗
1 −
1+￿
2
=
1
18
￿
δ(3 + ￿)
2 − 9(1 + ￿)
￿
≤− 6￿ ≤ 0, forδ ≤ ¯ δ
R
∗
2 −
1 − ￿
2
=
1
18
￿
δ(3 − ￿)
2 − 9(1 − ￿)
￿
≤ 0, forδ ≤
9(1 − ￿)
(3 − ￿)2 ≤ ¯ δ.￿
Proof of Proposition 4.3 Straightforward algebra allows us to obtain
φ(￿,α)=
∂R∗
1(α)
∂α
=
δ
2
￿
1
(1 − 2α)2 +
1 − 2α
(3 − 2α)3￿
2 −
4(2 − α)(1 − α)
(3 − 2α)2 ￿
￿
19Also,
∂φ
∂￿
=
δ
2
￿
2￿
1 − 2α
(3 − 2α)3 −
4(2 − α)(1 − α)
(3 − 2α)2
￿
< 0, for0 ≤ ￿ ≤ 1
. This proves the second part of the proposition.
We now compute φ(1,α). Some algebra allows us to write
φ(1,α)=
δ
2
￿
−1+
1
(1 − 2α)2 −
2
(3 − 2α)3 +
2
(3 − 2α)2
￿
> 0,
where the inequality is obtained using the fact that 0 < 1−2α ≤ 1a n dt h a t
2 < 3 − 2α ≤ 3. We have thus established that φ(￿,α) > 0, for0 ≤ ￿ ≤ 1,
which is the ﬁrst part of the proposition.￿
Proof of Proposition 4.4
t(λ)=δ[1 +
￿
3
(2λ − 1)]
This gives the revenue under harmonization in the small country 2
R2(λ)=δt(λ)
1 − ￿
2
The revenue in the small country attains a maximum at λ =1 . So
R2(1) = δ
￿
1+
￿
3
￿￿
1 − ￿
2
￿
Compared to the equilibrium revenue without harmonization
R
∗
2 = δ
￿
1 −
￿
3
￿￿
1
2
−
￿
6
￿
It follows that
R
∗
2 > R2(λ)f o r a l l λ
which completes the proof. ￿
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